The problem of generating an RSA composite in a distributed manner without leaking its factorization is particularly challenging and useful in many cryptographic protocols. Our first contribution is the first non-generic fully simulatable protocol for distributively generating an RSA composite with security against malicious behavior. Our second contribution is complete Paillier [Pai99] threshold encryption scheme in the two-party setting with security against malicious behavior. Furthermore, we describe how to extend our protocols to the multiparty setting with dishonest majority.
Introduction
Generation of RSA Composite.
Generating an RSA composite, N, (a product of two primes, p and q), and secret keying material (values related to φ(N )) in a distributed manner is an important question in secure computation. Many cryptographic protocols require such a composite for which none of the parties know its factorization. A concrete example where such a protocol is very useful is threshold cryptography where a number of parties exceeding a threshold is required to cooperate in order to carry out a cryptographic task; see [Rab98, Des94, Sho00, CDN01] for just a few particular examples. Another important application is using this composite for securely evaluating any function in the common reference string model (CRS) in a generic form [JS07] , or functions of specific interests such as the Fiat-Shamir authentication protocol [FS86, FFS88] , set-intersection [JL09] and oblivious pseudorandom functions [JL09] .
This computation has proven particularly challenging and most prior works assumed that the composite is generated by a trusted dealer. In a breakthrough result, Boneh and Franklin [BF01] showed a mathematical method for choosing a composite and verifying that it is of the proper form. Based on this method they designed a secure protocol in the multiparty setting for an honest-but-curious adversary with honest majority. Frankel et al. [FMY98] strengthened this result to be resistant to a fully malicious adversary. Additional solutions for testing primality in the multiparty setting appear in [ACS02, DM10] .
The two party setting posed additional barriers even in the semi-honest model. Cocks [Coc97] initiated the study of the shared generation of the RSA composite in the two-party semi-honest model. But the proposed protocol was later found to be insecure [Cop97, BBBG] . The problem was finally solved by Gilboa [Gil99] who presented a protocol in the semi-honest model.
In the malicious setting, Blackburn et al. [BBBG] started examining the setting of an arbitrary adversary, yet they do not provide a proof of security for their protocol. Concurrently, Poupard and Stern [PS98] proposed a solution that runs in time proportional to the size of the domain from which the primes are sampled, which is exponential in the security parameter. Furthermore, a second minor limitation is a requirement that one of the steps be computed in complete simultaneity. This probably can be fixed by adding commitments. They attempt to somewhat reduce the run time by introducing various modifications, however those are not proven, and as they leak some information presenting a proof of security (if at all possible) will not be a trivial thing. A detailed explanation about this construction and a discussion about the complexity of proving it appear in Appendix A. Thus, all these results do not offer an efficient and provable solution for the two-party malicious case.
Our first result. The first RSA key generation in the malicious setting which is an efficient, (nongeneric) protocol with a full simulation based proof of security.
Threshold Paillier.
A threshold cryptosystem usually involves two related yet separable components; (1) a distributed generation of the public keys and a sharing of the secret key of the cryptosystem and, (2) a decryption/signature computation from a shared representation of the secret key. Solutions for distributed discrete log based system key generation [GJKR07] , threshold encryption/decryption for RSA [GKR00, Sho00] , DSS [GJKR01] and Paillier [FPS00, DJ01, BFP + 01] in the multiparty setting have been presented. For some cryptosystems the techniques from the multiparty setting can be adapted to the two-party case in a more-or-less straightforward manner. However, here again the solution for the malicious two-party Paillier has proven more complex and elusive.
More specifically, as the RSA and Paillier encryption schemes share the same public/secret keys format of a composite N and its factorization, and the ciphertexts follow a similar algebraic structure, it may seem that decryption according to Paillier should follow the algorithm of RSA as shown in [CGHN01] . We observe that when decrypting as in RSA (i.e., raising the ciphertext to the inverse of N modulo the unknown order), the decrypter must first extract the randomness used for computing the ciphertext in order to complete the decryption. This property may be problematic in the context of simulation based security because it forces the simulator to present the randomness of the ciphertext instead of proving correctness using ZK proofs. We further recall that by definition, Paillier's scheme requires extra computation in order to complete the decryption (on top of raising the ciphertext to the power of the secret value) since the outcome from this computation is the plaintext multiplied with this secret value. In the distributive setting this implies that the parties must keep two types of shares.
Our second result. The first threshold Pailler in the malicious setting which is an efficient, (non-generic) protocol with a full simulation based proof of security.
Our contribution (in more details). In this work, we present the first fully simulatable and complete RSA key generation and Paillier [Pai99] threshold scheme in the two-party malicious setting. Namely, we define the appropriate functionalities and prove that our protocols realize them. Our formalization takes into account a subtle issue in the public key generation, which was noticed by Boneh and Franklin [BF01] . Informally, they showed that their protocol leaks certain amount of information about the product and further proved that it does not pose any practical threat for the security. Nevertheless, it does pose a problem when simulating, since the adversary can influence the distribution of the generated public key. We therefore choose to work with a slightly modified version of the natural definition for a threshold encryption functionality. Our scheme is comprised of the following protocols:
1. A distributed generation of an RSA composite. We present the first fully simulatable protocol for securely computing a Blum integer composite as a product of two primes without leaking information about its factorization. Our protocol follows the outlines of [BF01] and improves the construction suggested by [Gil99] in terms of security level and efficiency; namely we introduce an additional trial division protocol on the individual candidates for primes, which enables us to exclude many of them earlier in the computation. We note that [Gil99] did not achieve the trial division in the two party setting, thus our solution is the first for the two-party setting that achieves that. Here we take, a novel approach of utilizing two different additively homomorphic encryption schemes, giving us active security at a very low cost. In Appendix E we further show how to extend this protocol and the biprimality test to the multiparty setting with dishonest majority, presenting the first actively secure k parties RSA generation protocol, that tolerates up to k − 1 corruptions.
2.
A distributed biprimality test. We adopt the biprimality test proposed by [BF01] into the malicious two-party setting. This test essentially verifies whether the generated composite is of the correct form (i.e., it is a product of exactly two primes of an appropriate length). We provide a proof of security for this protocol. We note that although the biprimality test by Damgård and Mikkelsen [DM10] has a better error estimate, it cannot be used directly in the two-party setting with malicious adversaries. In Appendix D we show how to adapt their test into the two-party setting when the parties are semihonest.
3. Distributed generations of the secret key shares. Motivated by the discussion above, we present a protocol for generating shares for a decryption key of the form d ≡ 1 mod N ≡ 0 mod φ(N ). Specifically, we take the same approach of Damgård and Jurik [DJ01] , except that in their threshold construction the shares are generated by a trusted party. We present a protocol with semi-honest security and then show how to adapt it into the malicious setting.
A distributed decryption.
Finally, we present a distributed protocol for decrypting according to the decryption protocol of Damgård and Jurik [DJ01] , but for two-parties. Our protocol requires a few crucial differences from the [DJ01] protocol.
Efficiency. We provide a detailed efficiency analysis for all our subprotocols in Section 6. Roughly speaking, all our subprotocols have constant round complexity due to parallelization of the generation of RSA composites, including the biprimality tests and trial division, and the decryption of multiple instances. Moreover, all our zero-knowledge proofs (except one that achieves constant complexity on the average) run in constant rounds and require constant number of exponentiations. We note that the probability of finding a random prime is independent of the method in which it is generated, but rather only depended on the density of the primes in a given range. Thus, in comparing our results to generic solutions [JS07, IPS09, LP11] , on this front we fare the same as those solutions. However, due to our optimizations (cf. Section 6) we gain an advantage over the generic protocols. The fact that we are able to do the trial division greatly reduces the number of candidates that we are expected to test, e.g. for a 512 bit prime we would need to test about 31,000 candidates without the trial division and with it the number would be reduced to 484. We further note that the generic constructions in [JS07, LP11] , which operate over a binary circuit, require a circuit of size O(n log n) (for security parameter n), for computing a single multiplication. In [LP11] this overhead is further increased by a statistical parameter due to the cut-and choose technique and in [JS07] by approximately 720 RSA exponentiations per gate in (where these operations are computed modulo 2048 due to the Paillier's encryption scheme). In addition to the above, [JS07] requires a common reference string which consists of a strong RSA modulus. As for [IPS09] , which securely evaluates arithmetic circuits over finite rings (and fields), the asymptotic costs require an additive statistical parameter. In contrast, our protocols achieve constant overhead on the average per invocation, independently of the security parameter; see Section 6 for further details.
Preliminaries
We denote the security parameter by n. A function µ(·) is negligible in n (or just negligible) if for every polynomial p(·) there exists a value m such that for all n > m it holds that µ(n) < 1 p(n) . Let X = {X(n, a)} n∈N,a∈{0,1}
* and Y = {Y (n, a)} n∈N,a∈{0,1} * be distribution ensembles. Then, we say that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c ≡ Y , if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for every a ∈ {0, 1} * ,
We adopt the convention whereby a machine is said to run in polynomial-time if its number of steps is polynomial in its security parameter alone. We use the shorthand PPT to denote probabilistic polynomialtime.
In Appendix B we present the definition of secure multiparty computation used in this work. The definition is based on [Gol04, Chapter 7] , and is rather standard, so most readers will probably be familiar with the definition.
Hardness Assumptions
Our constructions rely on the following hardness assumptions.
Definition 1 (DDH)
We say that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard relative to G = {G n } if for all polynomial-sized circuits A = {A n } there exists a negligible function negl such that
where q is the order of G and the probabilities are taken over the choices of g and x, y, z ∈ Z q .
Definition 2 (DCR) We say that the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) problem is hard if for all polynomial-sized circuits A = {A n } there exists a negligible function negl such that
where N is a random n-bit RSA composite, r is chosen at random in Z N , and the probabilities are taken over the choices of N, y and r.
Public Key Encryption Schemes
We begin by specifying the definitions of public key encryption and semantic security. We conclude this section with a definition for homomorphic encryption, specifying two encryption schemes that meet this definition.
Definition 3 (PKE)
We say that Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a public-key encryption scheme if Gen, Enc, Dec are polynomial-time algorithms specified as follows:
• Gen, given a security parameter n (in unary), outputs keys (pk, sk), where pk is a public key and sk is a secret key. We denote this by (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 n ).
• Enc, given the public key pk and a plaintext message m, outputs a ciphertext c encrypting m. We denote this by c ← Enc pk (m); and when emphasizing the randomness r used for encryption, we denote this by c ← Enc pk (m; r).
• Dec, given the public key pk, secret key sk and a ciphertext c, outputs a plaintext message m s.t. there exists randomness r for which c = Enc pk (m; r) (or ⊥ if no such message exists). We denote this by m ← Dec pk,sk (c).
For a public key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) and a non-uniform adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), we consider the following Semantic security game:
Denote by Adv Π,A (n) the probability that A wins the semantic security game.
Definition 4 (Semantic security) A public key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is semantically secure, if for every non-uniform adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) there exists a negligible function negl such that
An important tool that we exploit in our construction is homomorphic encryption over an additive group as defined below.
Definition 5 (Homomorphic PKE) A public key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is homomorphic if for all n and all (pk, sk) output by Gen(1 n ), it is possible to define groups M, C such that:
• The plaintext space is M, and all ciphertexts output by Enc pk are elements of C.
• For any m 1 , m 2 ∈ M and c 1 , c 2 ∈ C with m 1 = Dec sk (c 1 ) and m 2 = Dec sk (c 2 ), it holds that {pk, c 1 , c 1 ·c 2 } ≡ {pk, Enc pk (m 1 ), Enc pk (m 1 + m 2 )} where the group operations are carried out in C and M, respectively, and the encryptions of m 1 and m 1 + m 2 use independent randomness.
Any additive homomorphic scheme supports the multiplication of a ciphertext by a scalar by computing multiple additions.
The Paillier Encryption Scheme
The Paillier encryption scheme [Pai99] is an example of a public key encryption scheme that meets Definition 5. We focus our attention on the following, widely used, variant of Paillier comprised of (Gen, Enc, Dec). Namely, the key generation algorithm, Gen, chooses two equal length primes p and q and outputs a public key pk that equals N = pq, and a matching secret-key sk = φ(N ). We use the simplified encryption function of Damgård and Jurik [DJ01] , i.e., use g = N + 1 as generator of the subgroup of Z N 2 of order N . Encryption of plaintext m with randomness r ∈ R Z * N (Z N in practice) is then,
Decryption is performed by,
The security of Paillier is implied by the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCR).
Additively Homomorphic ElGamal Variant
In our protocols we use an additively homomorphic variation of ElGamal encryption [ElG85] . Namely, let G be a group generated by g of prime order Q, in which the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard. A public key is then a pair pk = (g, h) and the corresponding secret key is s = log g (h), i.e. g s = h. Encryption of a message m ∈ Z Q is defined as Enc pk (m; r) = (g r , h r · g m ) where r is picked uniformly at random in Z Q . Decryption of a ciphertext (α, β) is then performed as Dec sk (α, β) = β · α −s . Note that decryption yields g m rather than m. As the discrete log problem is hard, we cannot in general hope to determine m. Fortunately, we only need to distinguish between zero and non-zero values, hence the lack of "full" decryption is not an issue. We abuse notation and write c · c to denote the componentwise multiplication of two ciphertexts c and c , computed by (α · α , β · β ), where c = (α, β) and c = (α , β ). We require that the parties run a threshold version for ElGamal for generating a public key and additive shares for the secret key, as well as a distributive decryption protocol. The key generation construction can be easily obtained based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol [DH76] with additive shares. A distributive decryption follows easily as well; see [HT10] for a complete description of distributive key generation and decryption protocols. Denote the distributed key generation protocol by π GEN and the distributed decryption protocol by π DEC .
Integer Commitment Schemes
In order to ensure correct behavior of the parties (and do so efficiently), our key generation protocol utilizes integer commitments which relies on the fact that the committer does not know the order of the group G, denoted by |G|, from which it picks the committed elements. Therefore, it cannot decommit into two different values m and m + |G|. This property is crucial for ensuring that the parties' shares are indeed smaller than some threshold. An example of such a commitment is the Paillier based scheme of Damgård and Nielsen [DN02, DN03] , which is comprised of the following two algorithms:
1. SETUP. The receiver, R, generates a Paillier key, N , i.e. an RSA modulus. It then picks r at random in Z * N 2 , computes g = r N , and sends N, g to the committing party, C, along with zero-knowledge proofs that N is an RSA modulus, and that g is a Paillier encryption of zero (cf. Section 3). HIDING/BINDING. The scheme is perfectly hiding, as a commitment is simply a random encryption of zero. Further, opening to two different values implies an N th root of g (which breaks the underlying assumption of Paillier, i.e., DCR).
Σ-protocols
Definition 6 (Σ-protocol) A protocol π is a Σ-protocol for relation R if it is a 3-round public-coin protocol and the following requirements hold:
• COMPLETENESS: If P and V follow the protocol on input x and private input w to P where (x, w) ∈ R, then V always accepts.
• SPECIAL SOUNDNESS: There exists a polynomial-time algorithm A that given any x and any pair of accepting transcripts (a, e, z), (a, e , z ) on input x, where e = e , outputs w such that (x, w) ∈ R.
• SPECIAL HONEST-VERIFIER ZERO KNOWLEDGE: There exists a PPT algorithm M such that
where M (x, e) denotes the output of M upon input x and e, and P (x, w), V (x, e) denotes the output transcript of an execution between P and V , where P has input (x, w), V has input x, and V 's random tape (determining its query) equals e.
Building Blocks: Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In order to cope with malicious adversaries, our protocols employ zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs. In this section we provide an informal description of the proofs we use; while some of these proofs are known, others are new to this work and are interesting by themselves. We note that except from a single proof, all proofs require a strict constant overhead. Fortunately, since our proofs are employed for multiple instances, the analysis of [CD09] ensures that the average overhead is constant.
Discrete Logarithms
1. The following Σ-protocol, denoted by π DL , demonstrates knowledge of a discrete logarithm. The proof follows due to Schnorr [Sch91] .
2. The Σ-protocol π DH demonstrates that a quadruple (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple, i.e. that log g 0 (h 0 ) = log g 1 (h 1 ) for g i , h i ∈ G. This proof is due to Chaum and Pedersen [CP92] .
3.2 Public Key Cryptosystems (and Commitment Schemes)
1. Protocol π ENC demonstrates knowledge of the plaintext of an encryption.
The protocols are due to Schnorr [Sch91] (for ElGamal encryption) and Cramer et al. [CDN01] (for Paillier encryption).
2. Protocol π ZERO demonstrates that a ciphertext c is an encryption of zero is captured by the following language.
For ElGamal this is merely π DH , demonstrating that the key and ciphertext are a Diffie-Hellman tuple. For Paillier encryption this is a proof of N th power shown by [DJ01] .
3. The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge π MULT proves that the plaintext of c 2 is the product of the two plaintexts encrypted by c 0 , c 1 . More formally,
This proof due to Damgård and Jurik [DJ01] (for both Paillier and ElGamal) . Note also, that this is not applicable in the case of commitments, though a similar proof of knowledge is possible when the contents of all three commitments are known, [DN02, DN03] ; this is required in π BOUND below.
4. Protocol π BOUND demonstrates boundedness of an encrypted value, i.e. that the plaintext is smaller than some public threshold B. Formally,
The "classic" solution is to provide encryptions to the individual bits and prove in zero-knowledge that they are bits using the compound proof of Cramer et al. [CGS97] . The actual encryption is then constructed from these.
An alternative is to take a detour around integer commitments; this allows a solution requiring only O(1) exponentiations [Bou00, Lip03, DJ02] . Sketching the solution, the core idea is to commit to α using a homomorphic integer commitment scheme; the typical suggestion is schemes such as [FO97, DF02] . The prover then demonstrates that α and B − 1 − α are non-negative (using the fact that any non-negative integer can be phrased as the sum of four squares), implying that 0 ≤ α < B. Finally, the prover demonstrates that the committed value equals the encrypted value. For simplicity, we may use the commitment scheme of Section 2.3. Note that for small B, the classic approach may be preferable in practice.
5. The proof π EQ is of correct exponentiation in the group G with encrypted exponent (where the encryption scheme does not utilize the description of G ). Formally,
The protocol is a simple cut and choose approach; its idea is originates from [CKY09] . Namely, the prover selects at random s, r s and sends c s = Enc pk (s, r s ) and h s to the verifier, who returns a random challenge bit b. The prover then replies with α · b + s and r b · r s , i.e. it sends either s or s + m. Privacy of α is ensured as long as the bit length of s is longer than the bit length of α by at least κ, where κ is a statistical parameter (fixing κ = 100 is sufficient to mask α). Note that it is only possible to answer both challenges if the statement is well-formed and thus the proof is also a proof of knowledge. In this work, we instantiate Enc with the ElGamal PKE. Finally, we note that the protocol is repeated in order to obtain a suitable level of security. For a challenge of length 1 inducing soundness 1/2, the number of repetitions must be ω(log n) for n the security parameter. Reducing the number of repetitions is possible by increasing the length of the challenge. However, in this case we must ensure that α · b + s is still private, namely, s is longer than the bit length of α plus the bit length of b, by at least κ. Finally, we point out that we can obtain constant amortized costs when the proof is instantiated with the technique of [CD09] .
3.3 New Zero-Knowledge Proofs 1. We include the folklore protocol π RSA for proving that N and φ(N ) are co-prime for some integer N , i.e. the protocols demonstrate membership of the language,
The solution is to let the verifier pick x = y N and prove knowledge of an N th root (essentially execute the Paillier version of π ZERO ). The prover (who generated N ) returns an N th root y . If the GCD is 1, then y is unique, hence y = y . Otherwise there are multiple candidates, and the probability that y = y is ≤ 1/2. This is repeated (in parallel) until a sufficiently low probability is reached. We note that this protocol is used only once, therefore its overhead does not influence the analysis. Constructing a simulator is straightforward by simply extracting y first and then sending it to the verifier.
2. We also require a zero-knowledge proof, π MOD , for proving consistency between two ciphertexts in the sense that one plaintext is the other one reduced modulo a public, fixed value (prime). This is required for proving correctness within the trial division stage included in the key generation protocol (cf. Section 4). Formally,
Informally, the parties additionally compute c = c · (c ) −1 p −1 , which is an encryption of α div p (assuming that c is correct). The prover then executes π BOUND twice, on (c , p) and on (c , M/p ), where M is an upper bound on the size of α. This demonstrates that α has been decomposed correctly, i.e. that the division has been performed correctly.
3. For public Paillier key N , we require Σ-protocol π EXP−RERAND that allows a prover to demonstrate that ciphertext c is in the image of φ :
In order to demonstrate this, the prover picks v, r v at random, and sends A = φ(v, r v ) to the verifier, who responds with a challenge e < N . The verifier then replies with (z 1 , z 2 ) = (ae + v, r e r v ), and the verifier checks that φ(
This is a Σ-protocol. To see this, note first that it is straightforward to verify completeness. Special soundness follows from the fact that for two accepting conversions (A, e, (z 1 , z 2 )) and (A, e , (z 1 , z 2 )) with e = e , we may find integers α, β such that α(e − e ) + βN = 1 using Euclid's algorithm (unless (e − e , N ) are not co-prime, which implies that we have found a factor of N ). It is easily verified that
is a preimage of c . Finally, the simulator for the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge is straightforward: given a commitment, pick (z 1 , z 2 ) at random and compute A.
A Zero-Knowledge Proof for π VERLIN
In this section we give the details of ZK proof π VERLIN used in Step 3a of Protocol 3. Let N P be a public Paillier key, with g = N P + 1 generating the plaintext ring. π VERLIN is a Σ-protocol allowing a prover P to demonstrate to a verifier V that a Paillier ciphertext, c x has been computed based on two other ciphertexts c and c as well as a known value, i.e. that P knows a preimage of c x with respect to
This is done by first picking a, a , a uniformly at random from Z N P and r a uniformly at random from Z * N P , and sending c a = φ (c,c ) a, a , a , r a to the verifier, V . V then picks a uniformly random t-bit challenge, 1 e, and sends this to P , who replies with the tuple z, z , z , r z = xe + a, x e + a , x e + a , r e x r a . V accepts if and only if φ (c,c ) (z, z , z , r z ) = c e x · c a .
Proposition 3.1 Assuming hardness of the DCR problem, π VERLIN is a Σ-protocol with constants costs.
Proof:
We prove that all three properties required for Σ-protocols (cf. Definition 6) are met.
Completeness. An honest prover always convinces the verifier, since
Special soundness. A preimage of c x may be computed given two accepting conversations with same initial message, c a , and differing challenges e =ē. Denote the final messages of the two executions (z, z , z , r z ) and (z,z ,z , rz), and compute integers α and β such that α (e −ē) + β · N P = 1 using the extended Euclidian algorithm. This is always possible as e −ē and N P are co-prime. It is straightforward but tedious to verify that
is a preimage of c x , briefly
Special Honest-Verifier Zero-knowledge. Accepting transcripts are easily simulated. Given challenge e, pick z, z , z uniformly at random from Z N P and r z uniformly at random from Z * N P
. Then, compute
Clearly, this is an accepting conversation. Moreover, for preimage (x, x , x , r x ) (i.e., the witness),
is uniformly random, and a preimage of c a , i.e. it corresponds to the choice of (a, a , a , r a ); hence c a is distributed as in the real protocol. Finally, given this random choice and a witness, (z, z , z , r z ) is exactly the final message that an honest prover would send.
A Distributed Generation of an RSA Composite
This section presents a protocol, denoted DKeyGen, for distributively generating an RSA composite without disclosing any information about its factorization and with security against malicious activities. In this protocol the parties generate candidates for the potential composite which they run through a biprimality test for checking its validity. Our protocol is useful for designing distributive variants of the RSA encryption and signature schemes, as well as other schemes that rely on factoring related hardness assumptions. In this paper we use this protocol for distributively generating the public key for Paillier [Pai99] encryption scheme. The starting point for DKeyGen is the protocols of [BF01, Gil99] . These protocols are designed to distributively generate an RSA composite N = p · q with an unknown factorization. The protocol by Boneh and Franklin [BF01] assumes honest majority, whereas the protocol by Gilboa [Gil99] adopts ideas from [BF01] into the two-party setting; both are secure in the semi-honest setting.
Recall that when coping with malicious adversaries it must be assured that the parties follow the protocol specifications. In our context this means that the parties' shares must be of the appropriate length and that no party gains any information about the factorization of N , even by deviating. 2 This challenging task is typically addressed by adding commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to each step of the protocol. Unfortunately, this is usually not very practical since the statements that needed to be proven are complicated, and therefore leading to highly inefficient protocols. Instead, we will be exploiting specific protocols for our tasks (some new to this work), that are both efficient and fully secured. By proper analysis of where to use zero knowledge proofs, which proofs to use and moreover, by a novel technique of utilizing two different encryption schemes with different homomorphic properties, we achieve a highly efficient key generation protocol. It should be noted that except for the setup step which is only executed ones we can avoid expensive zero knowledge proofs based on the cut and choose technique. Additional optimizations can be found in Section 6.
For the sake of completeness we include a short description of [BF01] as adapted by [Gil99] for the twoparty setting. These protocols consist of the following three steps: 1) Each party P i generates two random numbers p i and q i representing shares of p and q, such that p = i p i , q = i q i and p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). We note that [BF01] includes a distributed trial division of p and q for primes less than a bound B, which greatly improves the efficiency of the protocol. This trial division is not obtained by [Gil99] , making our solution the first two party protocol achieving the significant speedup from trial division. 2) After having created the two candidates for being primes the parties execute a secure multiplication protocol to compute N = (p 0 + p 1 )(q 0 + q 1 ). In [BF01] this step is based on standard generic solutions. Here we take a novel approach of utilizing both ElGamal and Paillier encryption schemes, giving us active security at a very low cost. Generating the RSA composite this way does not guarantee that the composite is made of uniformly random primes since the adversary can, in some limited way, influence the distribution of the primes. This issue was observed in [BF01] and discussed further below. 3) Finally, the candidate N for being an RSA composite is tested by a distributed biprimality test, which requires p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). If the biprimality test rejects N as being a proper RSA modulus, the protocol is restarted.
Typically, the definition for the key generation algorithm requires that the RSA composite would be a product of two randomly chosen equal length primes p and q. However, in order to use the distributed biprimality test of Boneh and Franklin N must be a Blum integer (namely, N = pq, where p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4). Note that this is a common requirement for distributed biprimality tests and it does not decrease the security of the constructions that use these type of keys, since about 1/4 of all the RSA modulus are Blum integers. Moreover, as pointed out by [BF01] , the parties can always influence the distribution of the most significant bit of each prime. This is because p and q are generated by adding shares over the integers which implies that they are not uniformly random, so that each party has some (limited) knowledge of the distribution based on its shares.
We will therefore define a new public key generation algorithm, Gen , which captures this deviation and generates N by the same distribution as the protocol. This is obtained by Gen receiving additional two inputs r p and r q , representing potential adversary's input shares. Gen adds this shares to some truly random chosen shares and ensures that the sum is congruent to 3 mod 4. Formally, let Gen (1 n , r p , r q ) denote a public key generation that takes two additional inputs besides the security parameter 1 n and works as follows:
1. If r p , r q ≥ 2 n−2 output ⊥ and halt.
2. Otherwise, choose a uniform random s p ∈ {0, 1} n−2 .
3. Calculate p = 4(r p + s p ) + 3 and examine the outcome:
• if p is composite, then goto
Step 2 and choose a new value for s p .
• if p is prime, then repeat the process to generate q.
4. Return N = pq, and generate the private key as in Gen.
As proved by Boneh and Franklin, using Gen instead of Gen does not give the adversary the ability to factor N even if it can slightly influence its distribution. We formally state the security statement proven by [BF01] , Lemma 4.1 (Revised [BF01, Lemma 2.1]) Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm B that chooses values (r p , r q ) as above, then given N ← Gen (1 n , r p , r q ) and finally, factors N with probability at least 1/n d . Then there exists an expected polynomial time algorithm B that factors a random RSA modulus with n-bit factors with probability at least 1/(2 7 n d ).
This lemma was originally stated for semi-honest adversaries but holds for the malicious case as well. We note that protocols with p and q being chosen as uniform random values do exist, however, they are significantly less efficient. Therefore, we choose to accept this nonuniform distribution induced by protocol DKeyGen and let the ideal functionality capture this deviation. Functionality F GEN formalizes this discussion.
Functionality F GEN
Key Generation: Upon receiving from party P i a (Generate, 1 n ) message, functionality F THRES sends a message (RandInput) to the adversary and waits for the adversary to reply with (GenInput, r a , r b ). F THRES then invokes (pk, sk)←Gen (1 n , r a , r b ), records sk and sends pk to the adversary. If the adversary replies allow, the functionality sends pk to the parties, ignoring further messages of this form. Otherwise, it sends ⊥ to the honest party. We are ready to describe our protocol which in addition to the above three steps includes a key-setup step used to generate keys for commitments and encryption schemes used in the protocol. Namely, a shared key is generated for the distributed additively homomorphic ElGamal encryption scheme and each party generates a key for standard non-distributive Paillier encryption and integer commitments. We observe that the reason for using both ElGamal and Paillier is due to efficiency considerations. Namely, most zeroknowledge proofs used here can be implemented in an efficient manner when applied on ElGamal (with a known group order), rather than on Paillier. Nevertheless, the plaintext cannot be recovered efficiently and therefore we use Paillier in a non-distributive fashion. We note that consistency between the encryptions using Paillier and ElGamal is only proven implicitly, by repeating the computations and verifying that the two executions give the same result. In addition, the fact that a distributive ElGamal variant can be easily obtained allows us to design a the trial division test that is run on individual primes and improves the numbers of trials. In order to cope with malicious adversaries, our protocols employ zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs, one of the ZK proofs (π BOUND ) relies on integer commitments, and we therefore commit to shares using integer commitments. Some of the ZK proofs are known, others are new to this work and are interesting by themselves. We note that all the proofs that participate in Protocol 3 require a strict constant overhead. In Section 3 we specify these proofs in detail.
Protocol 1 [DKeyGen]
A distributed generation of an RSA composite with malicious security:
• Inputs for parties P 0 , P 1 : A security parameter 1 n and a threshold B for the trial division.
1. Key-Setup.
(a) The parties run protocol π GEN (cf. Section 2.2.2) for generating a public key pk EG = (g, h) and secret key shares sk (a) Generate Shares of Candidate. Each party P i picks a random (n − 2)-bit valuep i , encrypts it and sends c i = Enc pkEG (p i ) to the other party. The parties prove knowledge of the plaintexts, via π ENC , and prove thatp i < 2 n−2 via π BOUND .
In order to ensure that p 0 ≡ 3 mod 4, the parties compute c 0 ← (c 0 ) 4 ·Enc pkEG (3). Similarly, the parties
For all primes α ≤ B, the parties run trial division on p = p 0 + p 1 . Each party P i sends an encryption c
to the other party, and proves the correctness of the computation using π MOD .
The parties compute c
is an encryption of zero. This is checked by raising these to secret, non-zero exponents and decrypting. If no prime α < B divides the candidate it is accepted by trial division.
(c) Repeat. Repeat Steps 2a-2b until two candidates p and q survive trial division.
Compute Product (N = pq).
(a) Compute the product. P 0 sends P 1 encryptions ofp 0 = p 0 andq 0 = q 0 under pk 0 Pa and proves knowledge of plaintexts using π ENC . (Note that a malicious P 0 may send encryptions of incorrect values). Next, P 1 computes and sends:
Furthermore, P 1 proves that cÑ −p0q0 has been computed as a known linear combination based on Enc pk 0 Pa (p 0 ) and Enc pk 0 Pa (q 0 ) using π VERLIN . P 0 decrypts, thus obtaining the plaintext mÑ −p0q0 ; from thisÑ = mÑ −p0q0 +p 0q0 is computed and sent to P 1 along with an encryption c π = Enc pk 0 Pa (p 0q0 ). Finally, using π MULT and π ZERO , P 0 proves that c π contains the product of the two original ciphertexts and thatÑ is the plaintext of
(b) Verify Multiplication. The parties use the homomorphic property of ElGamal encryption to compute an encryption of N = (p 0 + p 1 )(q 0 + q 1 ) from the ciphertexts generated at Step 2a. The computation is analogous to that of Step 3a, again using π MULT for proving correct multiplication of
The parties use secure decryption of distributed ElGamal π DEC (cf. Section 2.2.2) to obtain g N , where both verify that gÑ = g N , i.e. that N =Ñ and abort if equality does not hold.
Biprimality Test.
Execute biprimality test (cf. Section 4.1) and accept N if the test has accepted, otherwise the protocol is restarted from Step 2a.
Theorem 7 Assuming hardness of the DDH and DCR problems, Protocol 3 realizes F GEN in the presence of malicious adversaries.
A proof overview. Note that if both parties follow the protocol then a valid RSA modulus N is generated with high probability. Specifically, in the last iteration of the protocol two elements are chosen randomly and independently of previous generated candidates and are multiplied to produce N . By the correctness of the biprimality test specified below, N is a product of two primes with overwhelming probability.
We assume the simulator has knowledge of the distribution of the loops in the protocol, from the protocol returning to step 2a when candidates are rejected. The simulator can simulate the distribution by running the protocol "in its head", emulating the role of the honest party. Namely, denoting by P i the corrupted party, then upon extracting A's shares p i , q i , S picks two shares p 1−i , q 1−i as the honest party would do and checks whether N S = (p i + p 1−i )(q i + q 1−i ) constitutes a valid RSA composite. If this is not the final iteration of the protocol, implied by the fact that N S is not a valid RSA composite, S uses p 1−i , q 1−i to perfectly emulate the role of the honest P 1−i . If this is the final iteration, S asks the trusted party for F GEN to generate an RSA composite with p i , q i being the adversary's input (as specified in Figure 1 ) and completes the execution by emulating the role of the honest party on arbitrary shares. The simulation is different for the two corruption cases as the parties' role is not symmetric. For the case that P 0 is corrupted, the simulator sends back in
Step 3a the encryption of the composite returned from the trusted party and makes the ElGamal decryption decrypted into this composite as well. For the case that P 1 is corrupted the simulator "decrypts" the Paillier ciphertext result into that composite and then makes the ElGamal decryption return the same outcome.
In
Step 3a, where the parties compute the product, we note that it is insufficient to let P 1 complete the computation over the encrypted shares of P 0 without verification of correctness. The problem is that P 1 may attempt to compute N in a different, potentially failing way. Hence if it finds N , this may leak information. Although this issue does not seem critical for practical considerations we have to deal with it in order to obtain simulation based security. This makes this corruption case particular challenge since we had to show that an alternative computation in a successful execution implies determining the factors before the RSA-modulus is revealed.
The complete proof is done by a series of games and is found in Appendix C.1.
The Biprimality Test
The distributed biprimality test for checking the validity of a candidate for being an RSA composite, is based on a test by Boneh-Franklin [BF01] where the parties first agree on a random element γ ∈ Z * N with Jacobi symbol 1, and then raise γ to a power calculated from their shares. The test accepts a number with more than two prime factors with probability at most 1/2. Therefore, the parties must repeat this test sufficiently many times in order to decrease the error. We adopt this test for the malicious setting. We note that although the biprimality test by Damgård and Mikkelsen [DM10] has a better error estimate, it cannot be used efficiently in the two-party setting with malicious adversaries. In Appendix D we show how to adapt their test into the two-party setting when the parties are semi-honest.
Protocol 2 [DPrim] A distributed biprimality test:
• Inputs: A security parameter 1 n , a statistical parameter 1 and a public key candidate N .
• The Protocol:
1. The parties jointly generate a random element γ ∈ Z * N with Jacobi symbol J (γ) = 1. By standard techniques this is made secure against active deviation.
2. The parties compute the encryption e 0 = Enc pkEG N −(p0+q0)+1 4 using the homomorphic property of ElGamal (P 1 knows the encryptions of p 0 and q 0 from the earlier protocol). Furthermore, P 0 sends
mod N and proves consistency between e 0 and γ 0 using π EQ .
3. P 1 sends γ 1 = γ −(p 1 +q 1 ) 4 mod N to P 0 and proves consistency using π EQ to an encryption e 1 of
, computed as above.
4. Finally, the parties reject N if and only if γ 0 · γ 1 mod N = ±1. We further note that the test by [BF01] includes an additional step were instead of using γ, the parties randomly pick an element from the group
we omit the details due to the similarity of the above test.
5. This test is repeated times to achieve sufficiently small error.
Theorem 8 Assuming hardness of the DDH problem, Protocol 2 is a distributed Monte Carlo algorithm such that on a statistical parameter 1 and a random γ, it holds that
• A correctly formed RSA modulus N = pq, where p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4) is always accepted.
• The average case probability of accept if either p or q is a composite, is at most 2 − .
• The protocol is secure (simulatable with abort without knowledge of the factorization of N ) in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Correctness follows from [BF01] . Security is proven by simulation where the simulator is able to simulate the corrupted party's view by having knowledge of the adversaries shares of p and q, and thereby being able to calculate γ 0 or γ 1 , respectively. With this knowledge the simulator can simulate acceptance of a modulus without knowledge of the factorization. A complete proof can be found in Appendix C.2.
A Complete Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
In the following section, we describe our threshold construction in the two-party setting for the Paillier encryption scheme [Pai99] . Our Threshold Paillier Scheme, TPS, is comprised of the following subprotocols: (i) The protocol DKeyGen (cf. Section 4) for distributed generation of an RSA composite. (ii) A protocol for distributed generation of the corresponding secret-key shares, denoted by Dsk (cf. Section 5.1.1). (iii) A protocol for distributed decryption, denoted by DDec, for decrypting according to Paillier's specifications while maintaining the randomness of the ciphertext a secret (cf. Section 5.1.2). These protocols rely on the following standard hardness assumptions: (1) DDH (cf. Definition 1), due to employing the ElGamal scheme [ElG85] and (2) DCR (cf. Definition 2), due to employing the Paillier scheme [Pai99] and integer commitments [DN02, DN03] .
Our protocols form the first complete threshold scheme for Paillier in the two-party setting with security in the presence of malicious adversaries under full simulation based definitions, following the ideal/real model paradigm. We denote by Π = (Gen , Enc, Dec) the Paillier encryption scheme that is depicted in Section 2.2.1, with the modified key generation algorithm Gen specified in Section 4, encryption algorithm Enc and decryption algorithm Dec. The formal description of the threshold functionality, F THRES is found in Figure 2 .
Theorem 9 Assuming hardness of the DDH and DCR problems, scheme TPS = (DKeyGen, Dsk, DDec) computes functionality F THRES in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Proof: The proof for this theorem follows from the proofs for Theorems 7, 8, 10 and 11. That is, Theorems 7 and 8 form a complete key generation protocol, where the parties compute an RSA composite without leaking its factorization. Moreover, Theorems 10 and 11 guarantee that the parties decrypt according to Paillier in a secure manner.
A Distributed Decryption for Paillier
In this section we present a secure decryption protocol in the distributed setting. We first note that a typical way to decrypt is to use the algorithm of the RSA scheme, where the decrypter raises the ciphertext to the power of the inverse of N modulo φ(N ), as shown in [CGHN01] . This similarity follows because both DECRYPTION: Upon receiving a (Decrypt, c, Both) message from party P i , F THRES continues as follows:
1. If there exists a recorded secret key, then F THRES forwards (Decrypt, c, Both) to party P 1−i .
(a) If P 1−i replies with allow and Both = φ, F THRES sends Dec sk (c) only to P i .
Otherwise, if Both = φ, F THRES sends Dec sk (c) to both parties. (b) If P 1−i replies with disallow, then F THRES forwards disallow to P i .
2. If there does not exist a recorded secret key, functionality F THRES sends disallow to P i . schemes has the same public key of an RSA composite N and a secret key that is the factorization of N . Furthermore, the ciphertexts in both schemes have similar algebraic structure.
However, in some scenarios this type of algorithm may be problematic, since the decrypter must extract first the randomness used for computing the ciphertext in order to complete the decryption. As desirable as this property may be, it is problematic in the context of simulation based secure computation because the parties have to present the randomness of the ciphertext instead of proving correctness using ZK proofs. This means that a potential simulator cannot cheat in the decryption by encrypting arbitrary values and then fake their decryption. We further note that Paillier's scheme requires extra computation in order to complete the decryption. This means that on top of raising the ciphertext to the power of the secret value, the outcome must be multiplied with the inverse of the secret key in order to extract the plaintext. In the distributive setting this implies that the parties must keep two types of shares. When coping with malicious behavior it is not immediately clear how to efficiently verify the parties' computations. Notably, the protocol of Damgård and Jurik [DJ01] circumvents this technicality by having a trusted party picking a secret d ≡ 1 mod N ≡ 0 mod φ(N ).
Our protocol offers a distributive decryption for Paillier with simulation based security against malicious adversaries without randomness extraction. It is comprised of the following two subprotocols: First, the parties produce shares of a value d similarly to the Damgård-Jurik scheme [DJ01] . This protocol is executed only once. Next, the parties run the distributed decryption algorithm using their shares. As mentioned earlier we use the simplified encryption function of Damgård and Jurik, i.e., use g = N + 1 as a generator of the subgroup of Z * N 2 of order N . Encryption of a plaintext m with randomness r is then,
Generating a Shared Paillier Decryption Key
We now present our protocol for generating a shared Paillier decryption key. As stated, similarly to Damgård and Jurik [DJ01] , we share a decryption exponent
However, since there are only two parties, a full threshold sharing is not necessary and we therefore use an additive sharing. Initially, we focus on the task at hand and present a protocol with semi-honest security (where the parties are assumed to follow the protocol's description). This is then compiled into a protocol with full active security towards both parties by adding zero-knowledge proofs, ensuring that the parties cannot deviate.
Protocol 3 [Dsk]
A distributed generation of a shared Paillier decryption key with passive security:
• Inputs: A public RSA modulus N = pq with unknown factorization, additive shares of φ(N ): sk 0 = N − p 0 − q 0 + 1 and sk 1 = −p 1 − q 1 held by P 0 and P 1 respectively. A public ElGamal key (g, h) with the secret key shared between the parties. A public Paillier key N 0 N 2 with the secret key held by P 0 .
• The protocol:
1. P 0 encrypts sk 0 using N 0 and sends this to P 1 .
2. P 1 picks r 1 ∈ Z N and r σ ∈ Z 2 log N +κ uniformly at random (for a statistical parameter κ that enables to mask the secret key). P 1 computes an encryption of
using the homomorphic property of Paillier encryption. This is rerandomized and sent to P 0 .
3. P 0 decrypts, thus obtaining plaintext r 0 ; P 0 computes r 0 −1 mod N and encrypts this as well as plaintext sk 0 (r 0 −1 mod N ) under public key N 0 . Both ciphertexts are sent to P 1 .
4. Based on the encryptions of r 0 −1 mod N and sk 0 (r 0 −1 mod N ), P 1 computes an encryption of
P 1 then picksd 1 uniformly at random in Z 2 3 log N +κ , and computes and rerandomizes an encryption of d +d 1 . This is sent to P 0 and finally, P 1 sets its share of d to the integer −d 1 . Theorem 10 Assuming hardness of the DDH and DCR problems, Protocol 3 computes additive shares of a value d specified above in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
P
The proof can be found in Appendix C.3. We now demonstrate how to achieve security against malicious adversaries by adding zero-knowledge proofs to support correct behavior of each party.
ENSURING CORRECTNESS OF P 0 . First, P 0 must show that the plaintexts of the three encryptions sent in Steps 1 and 3 are as specified by the protocol. Demonstrating that the former encryption contains sk 0 is equivalent to the same task as in the calculation of N (see Protocol 3). Indeed P 0 could simply reuse the encryption from that protocol. Similarly, demonstrating that the later encryption contains the product of the two first ones is simply obtained by an invocation of π MULT .
The more challenging part is to have P 0 demonstrate that the second plaintext is the modulo N inverse of the encrypted value received in Step 3. This requires P 0 to send additional encryptions and execute zero-knowledge proofs based on the following:
1. P 0 executes π BOUND on the encryption of r −1 0 mod N , demonstrating that it is less than N .
2. P 0 sends an encryption of r ⊥ 0 = r 0 mod N under N 0 and uses π BOUND to demonstrate that it is less than N .
3. P 0 sends an encryption of r 0 = r 0 /N under N 0 and demonstrates that r ⊥ 0 + N · r 0 equals r 0 , i.e., equals the plaintext of the encryption received from P 1 , using the zero-knowledge proof π ZERO . (I.e., the above boils down to proving that the division of two ciphertexts in an N 0 th root.) 4. P 0 sends an encryption of r ⊥ 0 · (r −1 0 mod N ) and demonstrates correct multiplication using π MULT .
5. Both parties compute an encryption of (r ⊥ 0 · (r
. Namely, if the product is congruent to 1 mod N . This completes the description of the modified role of P 0 .
ENSURING CORRECTNESS OF P 1 . We continue with the description of P 1 . Security against malicious P 1 follows similarly to the security against a malicious P 1 during the computation of N . More specifically, P 1 is required to prove the correctness of computation specified by the following linear equations (sk 0 + sk 1 ) · r 1 + N · r σ in step 2 and sk 0 (r 0 −1 mod N ) · r 1 + (r 0 −1 mod N )(sk 1 · r 1 ) in step 4, where the variables introduced by P 1 are r 1 , r σ and sk 1 . This is done as follows:
• Proving honest behavior in step 2:
1. P 1 encrypts r 1 and r σ using the distributed homomorphic ElGamal scheme, and sends the ciphertexts to P 0 .
2. P 1 is using π VERLIN to prove knowledge of the values (sk 1 · r 1 ), r 1 and (N · r α ) and correct computation of the encryption of (sk 0 + sk 1 ) · r 1 + N · r σ = sk 0 · r 1 + sk 1 · r 1 + N · r σ .
3. After P 0 has decrypted r 0 , P 0 and P 1 reexecute the computation using the homomorphic ElGamal scheme, and using π MULT to prove correct multiplication. The result is decrypted to P 0 , which verifies whether the decryption of both schemes results in the same value r 0 . If this is the case P 1 has been following the protocol honestly.
• Proving honest behavior in step 4:
1. P 1 starts by pickingd 1 and encrypting it using the distributed homomorphic ElGamal scheme, and sends the ciphertexts to P 0 along with a proof of knowledge using π ENC .
2. P 1 is using π VERLIN to prove knowledge of the values (sk 1 · r 1 ), r 1 andd 1 and correct computation of the encryption of sk 0 (r 0 −1 mod N ) · r 1 + (r 0 −1 mod N )(sk 1 · r 1 ) +d 1 .
3. Again P 0 and P 1 reexecute the computation using the homomorphic ElGamal scheme, and using π MULT to prove correct multiplication. The result is decrypted to P 0 , which verifies whether the decryption of both schemes results in the same value d 0 . If this is the case P 1 has been following the protocol honestly.
Since P 1 does not explicitly prove consistency between the encryptions using the Paillier scheme and the ElGamal scheme we need to verify that a corrupted P 1 cannot return encryptions giving the same result which are computed using different values. If that was possible it would make simulating the security impossible. In step 2, it follows easily that if P 1 is capable of returning a Paillier Encryption where different values of (sk 1 · r 1 ), r 1 and (N · r α ) are used compared to the ElGamal encryption and that the two computations give the same result, then P 1 is able to compute sk 0 from either the Paillier encryption or the ElGamal encryption, which is a contradiction. In step 4, if P 1 is capable of returning a Paillier encryption and an ElGamal encryptions giving the same result, but using different values for (sk 1
. This is a contradiction since P 1 has only seen encryptions of sk 0 . (Note, sinced 1 =d 1 then r 1 = r 1 ).
2.d 1 =d 1 : In this case P 1 is able to compute a value δ which is divisible by (r 0 −1 mod N ). This is a contradiction since P 1 has only seen semantically secure encryption (Paillier and ElGamal) of (r 0 −1 mod N ). The value δ is computed as:
Performing a Joint Paillier Decryption
To perform a joint decryption of some ciphertext c, both parties need to raise c to their share of the key, d 0 or d 1 . They then demonstrate that this has been computed correctly using the commitments of the shares. The plaintext is immediately computable from c d 0 and c d 1 .
Protocol 4 [DDec]
A distributed Paillier decryption with a shared key:
• Inputs: A public Paillier key N = pq with unknown factorization and a ciphertext c = E N (m, r). Party P i holds its share d i of the secret decryption exponent,
Finally, the parties hold commitments to (or rather: ElGamal encryptions of) their key-shares.
1. P 0 sends c 0 = c sk0 mod N 2 to P 1 . Moreover, P 0 demonstrates that this has been done correctly by executing π EQ , i.e., that the committed number equals the discrete log of c 0 with base c and the plaintext encrypted with ElGamal.
2. P 1 sends c 1 = c sk1 mod N 2 to P 0 . Moreover, P 1 demonstrates that this has been done correctly by executing π EQ , i.e., that the committed number equals the discrete log of c 1 with base c and the plaintext encrypted with ElGamal. 
Theorem 11
Assuming that π EQ is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that correctly demonstrates equality of discrete logarithms, Protocol 4 determines the plaintext, m, of ciphertext c in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Proof: Simulation in a hybrid model with access to F EQ is straightforward. Namely, from P 0 viewpoint the only message received is c 1 , since the message of πDH are handled by F EQ . This value may be computed deterministically given the plaintext by:
Clearly this is the value sent by P 1 during the protocol execution, as
I.e., c 1 can be computed using values known to the simulator. The case of corrupt P 1 is equivalent.
We remark that though our decryption protocol is similar to that of [DJ01] , there are a few crucial differences: (i) First, since we only consider two parties, an additive secret sharing suffices. (ii) Moreover, secret sharing is done over the integers rather than attempting to perform a reduction modulo the secret value φ(N ) · N . (iii) Finally, the Damgård-Jurik decryption protocol requires N to be a product of safe-primes to ensure hardness of discrete logarithms. To avoid this requirement, we ensure equality of discrete logarithms in different-order groups.
The Efficiency of Our Protocols
In this section we discuss the efficiency of our protocols. We split our discussion into two parts: a theoretic analysis with a focus on the asymptotic complexity, and a more practical analysis where we comment on optimizations which have been left out in order to make above presentation clearer. We remark that all of our zero-knowledge proofs run in constant rounds and require constant number of exponentiationsthe only exception is π EQ , employed in our threshold decryption protocol, for which there is an amortized constant analysis due to Cramer and Damgård [CD09] . Preliminary results of implementing a protocol for distributively generating an RSA composite in the honest-but-curious setting can be found in [Nic11] . In his thesis, Nicolosi presents the first implementation of a complete distributed protocol for generating an RSA composite in the two-party setting. As expected, the bulk of computation is due to the number of attempts made to find a correct composite, and depends heavily on the threshold B picked for the trial division.
On the Number of Failed Attempts
The complexity of our protocol depends heavily on the number of failed attempts at generating the modulus. Without running a trial division the protocol has to restart with two freshly generated prime candidates after every rejected composite; or otherwise the leaked information would make factoring an accepted composite easy. Without trial division the expected number of tests is given by the probability of choosing two random primes simultaneously. This can be calculated by the Prime Number Theorem, making the expected number of executions: 512 bit primes: ln(2 512 )/2 2 ≈ 31000, 1024 bit primes: ln(2 1024 )/2 2 ≈ 126000.
Nevertheless, this can be dramatically improved when employing the trial division test. Following the analysis of [BF01] it can be shown that the probability a generated composite is a prime, given that it passes the trial division, is computed due to [DeB] and is as follows, Pr[p is prime | p passes trial division with threshold B] = 2.57 · ln B n 1 + o 1 n which for ln B = 9 (i.e., B = 8103) and n = 512 is approximately 1/22, and for n = 1024 is 1/44. This means that our protocol needs to test an expected number of 484 candidates when n = 512, and 1936 candidates if n = 1024. This shows how important our trial division is for the efficiency of the protocol, which is the first to incorporate this test securely in the two-party setting. We remark that this analysis is independent of the construction used for generating the composite and strictly relies on the primes density in a given interval.
Theoretic Efficiency
Key Generation. Ignoring the initial key-setup, the complexity of a single RSA-composite-generation attempt (except for the biprimality test) is dominated by the number of trial divisions; the rest of the secure computation requires only constant work and communication. Each of the trial divisions require only constantly many invocations of sub-protocols, including π MOD (and hence of π BOUND ) and all these subprotocols require only a constant number of exponentiations. Thus, we conclude that the total costs that are incurred by the entire protocol are linear in the number of trial divisions. Further, all sub-protocols at every step of the full protocol may be run in parallel, hence round complexity is constant.
Biprimality Test. The main part of the biprimality test consists of the verification of the secure exponentiation of the random γ. Further, in the test of [BF01] , the parties reach a negligible error probability by repeating the test times -as the test has one-sided error with probability at most 1/2, it must be run e.g. 40 times in order to achieve an error of 2 −40 . The most expensive part of the test is the execution of π EQ as it is a cut and choose protocol, i.e. we need O( ) exponentiations overall for each run, where is some statistical security parameter. However, as noted above this may be brought down to amortized constant overhead using the techniques of Cramer and Damgård [CD09] . Further, as the all tests may be run in parallel, round complexity is constant as well.
Secret-Key Shares. The generation of the multiplicative key shares requires constant overhead and constant round complexity. The communication/computation complexity is dominated by the multiple invocations of π BOUND and π VERLIN which obtain negligible soundness with constant overhead. We note that this protocol is executed only once.
Threshold Decryption. This protocol is dominated by the invocation of π EQ which requires constant number of exponentiations for long enough challenge (see more discussion about this proof in Section 3.2, Item 5). For batch decryption the technique of Cramer and Damgård [CD09] can be used here as well.
Practical Considerations
To ease the security proof, we have taken a pessimistic approach above. Namely, zero-knowledge proofs have been applied at all stages in order to catch cheating players at once. However, a more optimistic approach allows for a more efficient protocol: All but one of our RSA-composite-generation attempts fail, and most of the zero-knowledge proofs are only needed for the successful modulus generation -hence they may be postponed. In addition to this, further optimizations for distributed RSA key generation are possible. We refer to Boneh and Franklin [BF01] for a list of general optimizations some of which are also applicable in our setting. For the failing RSA-composite-generation attempts, we utilize the fact that the encryptions provided can be viewed as binding commitments. On failure, the parties reveal all random choices, thereby allowing the other party to verify their correct behavior by "executing" the protocol "in their head" and checking the correctness of the other party's messages, e.g. that plaintexts are appropriately bounded. Thus, overall efficiency of the many failing attempts will not be much more costly than twice that of failing attempts for the passively secure protocol. Once an attempt succeeds, ZK-proofs are used to ensure that this was correct. Slightly more formally, the key idea is that the simulator must know that the adversary is cheating (and that an honest party would detect this later, i.e. that the invocation should fail). We cannot simply postpone all proofs; care must be taken to allow simulation and to not reveal information that would allow a malicious party to, e.g., fake some zero-knowledge proof at a later point.
Generating the prime candidate. We may omit the invocations of π BOUND on p i and q i , as this statement is implicitly shown by the invocations of π MOD in the trial divisions. Further, verification may be postponed until we believe we have successfully generated an RSA-modulus; we cannot ensure correctness underway, but the encryption will be the same, thus, we still accept or reject as if we had run π BOUND immediately.
Trial division. We may postpone the invocations of π MOD at the cost of a few extra executions of simple proofs of knowledge, such as π ENC . This ensures that the party knows its input, and that the simulator knows whether a later invocation of π MOD may be successful (as it knows both what the input should be and what it actually is). If a trial division fails incorrectly, the honest party learns this when the corrupt party reveals its random choice, including its share of the random prime and the reduction modulo the trial-division-prime. If a trial division succeeds incorrectly, this can be discovered easily by performing the same trial-division on N -indeed at this point we may use a larger bound for the trial division as this can be performed very efficiently on the public N . The only remaining possibility is the case where the test should succeed, and did so despite one party providing an incorrect input. This case is handled by executing π MOD for each trial division once the biprimality test succeeds, at which point the honest party will detect the incorrect behavior.
Computing and verifying the product. For the Paillier computation, we may postpone all checks except the proof thatÑ was the plaintext of the encryption supplied by P 1 . Privacy of P 0 follows from the semantic security of Paillier encryption, while privacy for P 1 follows from the fact the encryption sent back by P 1 only contains the desired result. Leakage from constructing a potentially incorrect value is eliminated by the eventual execution of the full zero-knowledge proofs. Alternatively, we may avoid verifying the product altogether. This may leak a single bit of information, namely whether some function on the shares of the honest party equals the still hidden modulus, N . Depending on the setting, this leakage may or may not be acceptable.
Biprimality test. The invocation of π EQ can be postponed. If the test fails, the parties simply reveal their shares of the candidates; both parties may then verify that the other performed the exponentiations correctly. On the other hand, if the test succeeds, the parties have either determined an RSA composite or one of them has cheated. They now execute π EQ to determine which of the two is the case. Since the simulator knows the shares of the corrupt party, it is straightforward for it to check if the value supplied is the correct one.
A Distributed Generation an RSA Composite [PS98]
In [PS98], Poupard and Stern suggested a protocol that enables two parties to generate an RSA composite without the help of a trusted dealer. In particular, they showed how to evaluate any algebraic expression as follows: Let λ 0 and λ 1 denote the respective inputs of P 0 and P 1 sampled out of a polynomially bounded domain Λ, and let f denotes the public function that the parties wish to compute. Then, party P 0 chooses two random values α, β from a predetermined set and computes α · f (λ 0 , λ) + β for all λ ∈ Λ. Next, the parties run an oblivious transfer protocol [Rab81] where P 0 enters the above set and P 1 enters its input λ 1 to f . Upon completing this execution, P 1 learns y 1 = α · f (λ 0 , λ 1 ) + β. The parties repeat the above with reversed roles. Denote by y 0 = α · f (λ 0 , λ 1 ) + β , P 0 's output from the later oblivious transfer execution. Then, in the final step, the parties reveal (α, β, y 0 ) and (α , β , y 1 ) simultaneously and verify their outputs.
This protocol can be utilized to compute N = (p 0 + p 1 )(q 0 + q 1 ), where party P 0 enters two random shares denoted by p 0 , q 0 and P 1 enters its random shares, p 1 , q 1 . Nevertheless, the fact that it incurs linear costs in the size of the domain makes it impractical for super polynomial domains, as in most cases. In order to circumvent this problem, Poupard and Stern introduce the following solution. The parties agree first on M , as the smallest product of prime numbers greater than 2 n and compute the function in Z M . Now, since M can be factored into smaller, relatively prime factors, the parties run the protocol for each prime factor m i of M and then use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to combine these outcomes into the desired computation modulus M . Apart from the fact that the paper does not introduce a complete simulation based proof, this technique induces a problem when coping with malicious activity, as the protocol does not have a mechanism which verifies that the parties indeed use consistent inputs either for the multiple oblivious transfer executions, or even for a single invocation as in the original construction. In particular, it is not clear how to build such a practical mechanism. In addition, the efficiency of the later protocol still relies on the number of integers in the primes factorization of M and the sizes of the domains that they induce.
B Security in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries
In this section we briefly present the standard definition for secure multiparty computation and refer to [Gol04,  Chapter 7] for more details and motivating discussion. Two-party computation. A two-party protocol problem is cast by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as a functionality and denote it f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , where f = (f 1 , f 2 ). That is, for every pair of inputs (x, y), the output-vector is a random variable (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y) ranging over pairs of strings where P 0 receives f 1 (x, y) and P 1 receives f 2 (x, y). We sometimes denote such a functionality by (x, y) → (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)). Thus, for example, the oblivious transfer functionality is denoted by ((x 0 , x 1 ), σ) → (λ, x σ ), where (x 0 , x 1 ) is the first party's input, σ is the second party's input, and λ denotes the empty string (meaning that the first party has no output).
Adversarial behavior. Loosely speaking, the aim of a secure multiparty protocol is to protect honest parties against dishonest behavior by other parties. In this section, we outline the definition for malicious adversaries who control some subset of the parties and may instruct them to arbitrarily deviate from the specified protocol. We also consider static corruptions, meaning that the set of corrupted parties is fixed at the onset.
Security of protocols (informal).
The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in a real protocol execution to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted third party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted third party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the above-described ideal computation. One technical detail that arises when considering the setting of no honest majority is that it is impossible to achieve fairness or guaranteed output delivery [Cle86] . That is, it is possible for the adversary to prevent the honest party from receiving outputs. Furthermore, it may even be possible for the adversary to receive output while the honest party does not. We consider malicious adversaries and static corruptions in this paper.
Execution in the ideal model. In an ideal execution, the parties send their inputs to the trusted party who computes the output. An honest party just sends the input that it received whereas a corrupted party can replace its input with any other value of the same length. Since we do not consider fairness, the trusted party first sends the output of the corrupted parties to the adversary, and the adversary then decides whether the honest parties receive their (correct) outputs or an abort symbol ⊥. Let f be a two-party functionality where f = (f 1 , f 2 ), let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine, and let I ⊆ [2] be the set of corrupted parties (either P 0 is corrupted or P 1 is corrupted or neither). Then, the ideal execution of f on inputs (x, y), auxiliary input z to A and security parameter n, denoted IDEAL f,A(z),I (x, y, n), is defined as the output pair of the honest party and the adversary A from the above ideal execution.
Execution in the real model. In the real model there is no trusted third party and the parties interact directly. The adversary A sends all messages in place of the the corrupted party, and may follow an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. In contrast, the honest parties follow the instructions of the specified protocol π. Let f be as above and let π be a two-party protocol for computing f . Furthermore, let A be a nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine and let I be the set of corrupted parties. Then, the real execution of π on inputs (x, y), auxiliary input z to A and security parameter n, denoted REAL π,A(z),I (x, y, n), is defined as the output vector of the honest parties and the adversary A from the real execution of π.
Security as emulation of a real execution in the ideal model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of protocols. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure party protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated by saying that adversaries in the ideal model are able to simulate executions of the real-model protocol.
Definition 12 Let f and π be as above. Protocol π is said to securely compute f with abort in the presence of malicious adversaries if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A for the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S for the ideal model, such that for every I ⊆ [2], Reactive functionalities. Until now we have considered the secure computation of simple functionalities that compute a single pair of outputs from a single pair of inputs. However, not all computations are of this type. Rather, many computations have multiple rounds of inputs and outputs. Furthermore, the input of a party in a given round may depend on its output from previous rounds, and the outputs of that round may depend on the inputs provided by the parties in some or all of the previous rounds. In the context of secure computation, multi-phase computations are typically called reactive functionalities. Such functionalities can be modeled as a series of functions (f 1 , f 2 , . . .) where each function receives some state information and two new inputs. That is, the input to function f j consists of the inputs (x j , y j ) of the parties in this phase, along with a state input σ j−1 output by f j−1 . Then, the output of f j is defined to be a pair of outputs f j 1 (x j , y j , σ j−1 ) for P 1 and f j 2 (x j , y j , σ j−1 ) for P 2 , and a state string σ j to be input into f j+1 . We stress that the parties receive only their private outputs, and in particular do not receive any of the state information; in the ideal model this is stored by the trusted party.
C Omitted Proofs C.1 A proof of Theorem 7 for Securely Generating an RSA Composite Proof: The proof is shown in a hybrid model, where a trusted party replaces the protocols π GEN , π ENC , π MOD , π VERLIN , π MULT , π ZERO , π DEC and DPrim. We assume the simulator S has knowledge of the distribution of the loops in the protocol, from the protocol returning to step 2a when candidates are rejected. The simulator can simulate the distribution by running the protocol "in its head", emulating the role of the honest party. Namely, denoting by P i the corrupted party, then upon extracting A's shares p i , q i , S picks two shares p 1−i , q 1−i as the honest party would do and checks whether N S = (p i + p 1−i )(q i + q 1−i ) constitutes a valid RSA composite. If this is not the final iteration of the protocol, implied by the fact that N S is not a valid RSA composite, S uses p 1−i , q 1−i to perfectly emulate the role of the honest P 1−i . If this is the final iteration, S asks the trusted party for F TRES to generate an RSA composite with p i , q i being the adversary's input (as specified in Figure 2 ) and completes the execution as follows. We distinguish between corruption of P 0 and P 1 . P 0 is corrupted. Let A denote an adversary controlling party P 0 . Then, construct a simulator S simulating the view of the adversary as follows.
KEY-SETUP.
(a) S emulates the trusted party F GEN by generating an ElGamal key pair (pk EG , sk EG ), sharing sk EG to sk S EG and sk A EG and handing pk EG and sk A EG to A. (b) S generates a Paillier key pair (pk S Pa , sk S Pa ) as described, sends pk S Pa to A, and receives a key pk A Pa from A. π RSA is executed to verify that the Paillier keys are well formed. 2. GENERATE CANDIDATES. S andc (α) ← c (α) · Enc pk EG (−α), and raising these to secret, non-zero exponents.
S simulates decrypting, by emulating the output of F DEC to be either zero or a random nonzero element in the plaintext space. A nonzero element is output when trial division by α should succeed, and zero is the output when trial division should fail. This is simulated according to the distribution of the execution.
(c) REPEAT. Repeat step 2a and 2b according to the distribution of execution.
COMPUTE PRODUCT (N = pq).
(a) COMPUTE THE PRODUCT. S sends p 0 and q 0 to F THRES and receives an RSA composite N from F THRES . If A does not deviate and sends proper encryptions of p 0 , q 0 , S simulates cÑ −p 0q0 ← Enc pk 0 Pa (N − p 0 q 0 ) and emulates F VERLIN as accepting. S then receivesÑ and c π from A and emulates F MULT and F ZERO by receiving the witnesses and verifying the statements. If the conditions for accepting are not met, S halts, aborting the execution. If A does not send proper encryptions of p 0 , q 0 , S uses p 1 , q 1 , picked at the outset of this iteration, for completing the execution. (Note that N S = (p 0 + p 1 )(q 0 + q 1 ) form a valid RSA composite. Looking a head, this would imply that the decryption of cÑ −p 0q0 is identically distributed in both the simulated and hybrid executions since in both cases the adversary sees some information of shares picked as the honest P 1 would).
(b) VERIFY MULTIPLICATION. S simulates the computation of the encrypted N by running the protocol as specified and emulating F MULT twice; once by receiving the witness and verifying the statement, and once by emulating an accepting answer for verifying the honest P 1 's computations. If A did not deviate in step 3a, then S emulates ideal execution for F DEC as outputting g N = gÑ where N is the composite returned by F THRES .
If A deviated in step 3a, then S emulates F DEC as outputting g N S = gÑ , and aborting the protocol.
BIPRIMALITY TEST.
Simulate DPrim as either accepting or rejecting according to the distribution of the protocol run, which can be done by Theorem 8.
Clearly S runs in expected polynomial time, it is left to prove indistinguishability of the simulation in the ideal world and the hybrid execution of the protocol. This will be done by a series of games.
Game H 0 . This game corresponds to the original simulation.
Game H 1 . In this game there is no functionality F THRES . Instead, simulator S 1 generates the RSA modulus N by itself the same way F THRES does it. This means S 1 knows the factorization of N . Furthermore, S 1 plays the exact same role as S. H 1 is clearly perfectly indistinguishable from H 0 .
Game H 2 . Simulator S 2 does not know the secret ElGamal key. That is, instead of emulating F GEN in step 1a, S 2 receives pk EG from an oracle, generates a random share as sk A EG and hands pk EG and sk A EG to A. Since S 1 does not use its knowledge of sk EG , and since sk A EG can be simulated statistically close to the real value. H 2 is statistically indistinguishable from H 1 .
Game H 3 . In this game simulator S 3 uses N instead of N S in case A deviates in Step 3a of the simulation above. Then, the only difference between the views of games H 2 and H 3 is with respect to this step. However, since the rest of the messages computed by S 2 and S 3 are independent of these composites. The adversary's view is identically distributed in both games.
Game H 4 . In this game simulator S 4 does not simulate the ElGamal ciphertexts by sending encryptions of 0, rather it sends encryptions of the real shares that yield the right RSA composite N . More specifically, since S 4 extracts the shares p 0 , q 0 of A and since S 4 generates N by itself it can compute shares p 1 , q 1 such that N = (p 0 + p 1 )(q 0 + q 1 ), and simulate the execution resulting in an accepted N .
H 4 is computationally indistinguishable from H 3 which can be proven by a reduction to the sematic security of ElGamal (according to semantic security game specified in Definition 4). More formally, the reduction goes as follows: We assume the existence of an distinguisher D 3−4 capable of distinguishing H 3 from H 4 with more than negligible probability. We now construct an adversary A EG for breaking the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption scheme. A EG follows S 4 's instructions, except instead of encrypting values with the pk EG it asks an oracle to encrypt either m 0 = 0 or m 1 being the real share that yields a proper prime. A EG completes the execution of D 3−4 as in game H 4 . If D 3−4 guesses H 3 as being executed, then A EG outputs 0, if D 3−4 guesses H 3 as being executed, then A EG outputs 1.
Game H 5 In this game simulator S 5 does not extract the shares of the candidates for being primes from A. Instead, S 5 generates the shares as the honest P 1 does in the hybrid execution. This implies that the only difference in A's view within executions H 4 and H 5 is with respect to step 3b of the simulation above, where S 4 makes the protocol abort if A deviates in step 3a by not sending proper encryptions of p 0 , q 0 . Note that there are two cases here: 1) A deviates by sending encryptions of values different than p 0 and q 0 , which leads to a different composite than the one computed using the ElGamal encryptions in Step 2a of the simulation. 2) A deviates by sending encryptions of values different than p 0 and q 0 , which leads to a the same composite than the one computed using the ElGamal encryptions in Step 2a.
Focusing on (1), we note that the adversary always sees the same view in both games, since in both cases it sees some information of the real shares picked by P 1 that correspond to N . As for (2), we note that as described in appendix C.1.1, honest P 1 always detects such a cheating, implying that H 4 is statistically close to H 5 .
Finally, since H 5 corresponds to executing the real protocol in the hybrid model, we conclude that if P 0 is corrupted then the real execution and the ideal world are computationally indistinguishable. P 1 is corrupted. Let A denote an adversary controlling party P 1 . Then, construct a simulator S as follows. All steps except step 3a are analog to the previous simulation.
COMPUTE PRODUCT. (N = pq)
(a) COMPUTE THE PRODUCT. S simulates the encryptions ofp 0 andq 0 as encryptions of 0 under pk S Pa and emulates F ENC , as accepting. S receives cÑ −p 0q0 from A and during emulation of F VERLIN , S extracts the values p 1 q 1 and p 1 q 1 , and if these values are not consistent with the values extracted in step 2a, then S continues simulating the protocol using N S and p 0 , q 0 . If A does not deviate, S sends encryption ofÑ = N to A along with an encryption c π = Enc pk 0 Pa (0) and emulates F MULT and F ZERO as accepting.
Clearly S runs in expected polynomial time, it is left to prove indistinguishability of the simulation in the ideal world and the real execution of the protocol. This will be done by a series of games.
Game H 0 -H 4 . These games are identical to H 0 -H 4 in the case of corruption of P 0 Game H 5 . In this game simulator S 5 does not simulate the Paillier encryptions by encryptions of 0. Instead, it sends the encryption of p 0 q 0 . We claim that H 4 and H 5 are computationally indistinguishable. The proof is completely analog to the indistinguishability of H 3 and H 4 .
Game H 6 . In this game simulator S 6 does not extract the shares of the candidates for being primes from A in step 2a and step 3a. Instead, S 6 generates the shares as the honest P 0 does in the hybrid execution. Recall that in the previous game S 5 makes the protocol abort in step 3b if A deviates in step 3a, however, as described in appendix C.1.1 this will also be the case in this game. Therefore, we have that H 5 and H 6 are statistically close.
Since H 6 corresponds to executing the real protocol in the hybrid model, we conclude that if P 0 is corrupted then the real execution and the ideal world is computationally indistinguishable.
C.1.1 Deviation while ComputingÑ is Always Detected
The ZK proofs used in the calculation ofÑ in Step 3a in Protocol 3 ensure that the parties computeÑ based on values they know, but not that the correct p i and q i are used for this computation. More specifically, this step ensures thatÑ ≡ N mod N 0 , where N 0 is the Paillier key picked by P 0 . However, this does not rule out from a malicious party, A, supplying wrong values but still getting the right result. For instance, A can guess the difference δ between p and q and switch the factors around by using p i + δ and q i − δ instead of p i and q i , respectively. Now, since we have that
the product of p i + δ and q i − δ still equals N . Intuitively, this specific attack is infeasible, however, we must rule out all such attacks. A much worse attack would be one where the attacker could induce failure, say depending on some specific bit of N (which is of course unknown to A at the time). In a real execution of the protocol, since N is the output, A simply learns the bit ahead of time, which may not be critical in practise. However, in the simulated execution, A learns a bit of the simulated modulus, N , which may differ from the analogous bit of the modulus supplied by the ideal functionality, N F THRES . Hence A may be able to distinguish between the executions.
In this section we show that no such behavior is possible. Specifically, we show that if an execution with a malicious A results inÑ = N , then this must have been computed using the correct shares of p and q. We do this by using A to break the semantic security of either ElGamal or Paillier encryption (cf. Definition 4). We distinct the cases of corrupted P 0 and P 1 . P 0 is corrupted. Let A denote an adversary controlling party P 0 and denote by bad the event in which a malicious P 0 sends in Step 3a of Protocol 3 encryptions ofp andq withp 0 = p 0 ∨q 0 = q 0 and an honest P 1 does not abort the execution (where p 0 , q 0 are the decryptions of ciphertexts sent in Step 2a using the ElGamal scheme). Then, conditioned on bad, we have that
since the execution of π MULT ensures that P 0 correctly adds the product of the two initial values in the final step, andÑ = N would be caught in the following step, causing P 1 to abort. This implies that we know
and either α = 0 or β = 0. These values will be used to determine information about p 1 and q 1 which may, in turn, be used to break the semantic security of ElGamal.
More formally, assume bad occurs with probability . Then, construct an adversary A EG that breaks the semantic security of ElGamal with probability 1/2 + /2 as follows. Given an ElGamal public key pk EG = (g, h ), and a ciphertext c b which is an encryption of b ∈ {0, 1}, A EG simulates the initial key generation by replacing pk EG with pk EG (faking the proof that knows part of the decryption key). A EG then extract p 0 and q 0 from A's ElGamal encryptions and generates two independent sets of candidates, p
(1) 1 which will pass trial division. A EG then computes encryptions of one of the pairs:
1 . A EG then simulates the trial division (which is passed), and finally reach the step, where it computesÑ , and extractsp 0 andq 0 from A. Note that this allows A EG to compute α, β, and γ without even completing this step. A outputs 0 if and only if
Due to π RSA , it holds that N 0 is the product of two large primes with overwhelming probability. Neglecting the event where N 0 is a product of more than two primes, it holds that p 1 and q 1 are co-primes to N 0 . In addition, if either GCD(α, N 0 ) = 1 or GCD(β, N 0 ) = 1, we may compute a factor f of N 0 , such that α ≡ 0 mod f ∨ β ≡ 0 mod f and both α and β co-prime with f unless congruent to 0. Otherwise let f equal the trivial factor, N 0 . As the execution would pass if it continued, it must holds that
i.e. we find a linear equation in p 1 and q 1 . However, these will be either p
1 depending on the unknown bit chosen by the ElGamal oracle. Hence, if A can cheat with probability , then A EG breaks the semantic security of ElGamal encryption with probability 1/2 + /2 by checking which pair of candidates gives a linear equation of the form specified above. Formally,
where negl is a negligible function in the security parameter. The reason A EG outputs 0 with negligible probability in the case where b = 1 is due to the fact that p
1 , q
1 are independent of p
1 and information theoretic hidden from A (as A EG either uses p P 1 is corrupted. Let A denote an adversary controlling party P 1 and consider the event bad in which the honest P 0 does not abort even though the malicious P 1 computes cÑ −p 0 q 0 differently than specified. Note that even if A returns a ciphertext cÑ −p 0 q 0 , encrypting N − p 0 q 0 and computed differently than specified in the protocol, the ZK proof π VERLIN enables to extract values x, x , x ∈ Z N 0 and r x ∈ Z * N 0 such that
where c is an encryption of p 0 and c is an encryption of of q 0 . These values will be used to break either the semantic security of either ElGamal or Paillier encryptions. First, construct a distinguisher A Pa based on A which breaks the semantic security of Paillier encryption. Simulate steps I through IV, but use the Paillier key to break as N 0 ; also extract p 1 and q 1 during the simulation. As ElGamal encryption is semantically secure, this will be indistinguishable from a real protocol run.
In step V, we receive a Paillier encryption c b of a bit b from the oracle. Similarly to above, we generate two sets of candidates, p
(1) 0 which will pass trial division, and compute encryptions of one of the pairs:
We send c p 
There are two cases:
In this case, we can compute either p 
This calculation requires that the non-zero value is invertible. However, if it is not, then we may compute a factor of N 0 using GCD. This allows us to compute the decryption key ourselves, which trivially breaks semantic security.
Case 2: q 1 − x = 0 ∧ p 1 − x = 0. Again, we may assume that both q 1 − x and p 1 − x are invertible. Similarly to the case of a corrupt P 0 , we now have a linear equation in p 0 . Then in the computation ofÑ , we obtain x, x , x , and r x , which again may be split into two cases and used to break semantic security.
C.2 A Proof of Theorem 8 for Securely Testing Biprimality
Proof: The theorem states both correctness and security. By correctness we mean: If the parties do not deviate, then Blum integers are never rejected whereas, numbers with more than two prime factors are rejected with probability at least 2 − . Since the biprimality test is identical to the one of Boneh and Franklin [BF01] , we refer the reader to [BF01] for a proof of correctness.
Security:
The security is proven in the F EQ -hybrid model. We assume that simulator S has knowledge of the shares of adversary A from protocol DKeyGen for distributively generating an RSA composite. Observe that there are two possible outcomes of DPrim, either N is rejected, in which case N is not a Blum integer in the real protocol. This can easily be simulated by S choosing shares on behalf of the honest player such that N is not a Blum integer and executing the real protocol as the honest party would. It is easy to verify that if A deviates then it cannot make π EQ accept. In the other case, N is a Blum integer and should be accepted. Therefore, S has to be able simulate A's view without knowing the factorization of N , which is possible in the following way. Assume that P 0 is corrupted by A; the simulation is analog to below if P 1 is corrupt.
1. S emulates the choice of γ by choosing a uniform random value a ∈ Z * N with Jacobi symbol J (a) = 1 and a uniform random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and outputs γ = a 2 (−1) b mod N to the adversary A. , we note this is done with simulated values for p 1 and q 1 .
S sends γ S = (γ A ) −1 (−1) b mod N to A and emulates F EQ accepting.
Finally, the parties rejects N if and only if
The simulation of the additional test in the group (Z N [x]/(x 2 + 1)) * /Z * N is analog to the simulation described above.
Note the following:
I. Because N is a Blum integer, the size of the subgroup of quadratic residues QR in Z * N is half the size of the subgroup of elements with Jacobi symbol 1 in Z * N . (−1) is a quadratic nonresidue modulo N with Jacobi symbol J (−1) = 1. This means that γ is a uniform random element of Z * N with Jacobi symbol J (γ) = 1. This is the exact distribution in the real execution, since we assume A cannot influence the distribution of γ in DPrim.
II. In the real world execution of DPrim the following holds:
From b, S knows, whether γ is in QR or not, and therefore γ S is simulated perfectly by
Finally, since all values except the encryptions e 0 and e 1 are simulated perfectly A can only distinguish the real and hybrid executions if it can break the sematic security of ElGamal, and therefore break the DDH assumption.
C.3 A Proof of Theorem 10 for Securely Generating Shares for Decryption Key Proof: The case follows by two corruption cases. P 0 is corrupted. We demonstrate how to generate a view statistically close to that of P 0 . During the protocol, P 0 receives two messages: the encryptions of r 0 and d 0 . As the encryptions have been rerandomized, they are indistinguishable from fresh encryptions of the plaintext values. Moreover, both of these are statistically close to uniformly random:
• r 0 mod N is uniformly random in Z N due to the multiplication by r 1 .
• r 0 /N is statistically close to a uniformly random log N + κ bit integer.
• d 0 is statistically close to a uniformly random 3 log N + κ bit integer.
Hence, to simulate, it suffices to pick and encrypt values distributed as the masks generated by P 1 . P 1 is corrupted. We cannot achieve unconditional security towards P 1 , however, a computationally indistinguishable view may be generated. During the protocol, the messages received by P 1 consist of three Paillier encryptions under the key N 0 . Assuming that Paillier encryption is semantically secure, this is indistinguishable from three encryptions of 0.
D The [DM10] Biprimality Test: The Two-Party Case
This section describes how the biprimality test by Damgård and Mikkelsen [DM10] works, and how it is applicable in the two-party case in the honest-but-curious setting. How to adapt the test to the malicious case, without applying generic and rather inefficient zero knowledge proofs is currently unknown. As with the previous biprimality test the objective is to test a number N = pq, with p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4) to check whether p and q are both primes. We assume N to be public and p and q to be additively shared between the two parties. The test is basically the Miller Rabin [Rab80] primaility test, run first on p and afterward on q, exploiting the fact that N is public to do this efficient. We also assume a distributed ElGamal scheme as described in section 2.2.2 is set up, and that P 0 has generated a paillier key pair.
First we note that using the Miller Rabin [Rab80] primaility test on a number p ≡ 3 (mod 4), all that is needed to test is whether γ (p−1)/2 ≡ ±1 (mod p) for a randomly picked γ ∈ Z * p . Next we note that it does not make a difference if we randomly pick γ ∈ Z * N . Focusing on p, the test verifies that γ (p−1)/2 ≡ ±1 mod p for a randomly picked γ ∈ Z * N . First party P i computes β i :
We note that:
where (3) to (4) follows from the fact that p|N ; thus reducing β i modulo p is equivalent to reducing γ (p i −(1−i))/2 modulo p directly. It remains to be shown how to perform the modulo reductions and check for equality in (4) securely.
Modulo Reductions an Equality Testing in (4): We first note, that:
p p, and we assume an approximation a (i) of β i /p , where a (i) is held additively shared, a 0 to P 1 . Using the homomorphic property of the ElGamal scheme this allows P 1 to compute encryptions of:
, where the k i 's are small integer values due to the fact that the a (i) are only approximations. If (and only if) β 0 ≡ β 1 mod p (respectively β 0 ≡ −β 1 mod p), the difference (respectively sum) will be a small multiple of p. Hence, we may check whether β 0 ≡ ±β 1 mod p using a small number of equality tests (β 0 + β 1 = 0, (β 0 + β 1 ) − p = 0, (β 0 + β 1 ) − 2p = 0, etc): First the parties randomly permute the ciphertexts in question; then they raise each one to a random, non-zero exponent; finally the parties decrypt each cipher text -if one was an encryption of 0, they conclude that β 0 ≡ ±β 1 mod p. This leaks no information due to the (secret) permutation and random exponentiations.
Computing a (i) ≈ β i /p : The approximation, a (i) , of β i /p is obtained by first computing
which is an approximation of 2 m a (i) , where m is a bit-length ensuring that a (i) will be sufficiently accurate, making k, the number of tests, above sufficiently small. For a thoroughly analysis of the size of m, the reader is referred to [DM10] . An additive sharing ofã (i) over the integers may be computed based on Paillier encryption with P 0 's keys. The Paillier key, has to be sufficiently big, such that the following calculations, will not lead to an overflow modulo the modulus. This implies that the following calculations are done over the integers, although they are done modulo the modulus of the Paillier key. The value 2 m N is a public value, and the rest is integer computation, thus: P 0 sends encryptions of q 0 , β 0 and q 0 · β 0 to P 1 , which for i ∈ {0, 1} computes encryptions of the values:
Finally P 1 picks two uniformly random valuesã
1 κ bits longer than theã (i) , where κ is a security parameter, and returns and encryptions ofã
to P 0 for i ∈ {0, 1}. P 0 decrypts and stores bothã 1 , and note that their sum is the required approximation, a (i) :
E Generalizing to the Multiparty Case
Our protocol may be generalized to the multiparty case in the setting with dishonest majority and a static adversary. Our construction is comprised of the following two parts: 1) securely determining the modulus N , and 2) obtaining a threshold Paillier key. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first multiparty protocol for a distributed RSA composite generation, which is actively secure against an adversary corrupting all but one of the parties. Moreover, despite Cramer et al. [CDN01] and Damgård and Nielsen [DN03] demonstrating efficient, general multiparty computation given only a public Paillier key with a shared secret key (provided by some third-party, which could be replaced by a secure protocol), previous papers on RSA composite generation have disregarded the shared Paillier decryption key and focused solely on generating the modulus. We are the first to present a protocol for generating a full, distributed Damgård-Jurik key 3 [DJ01] . For clarity, we take a high-level view of these protocols. Further, as the protocols are described with clarity, rather than efficiency, in mind, many straightfoward optimizations are possible.
In the following, let k denote the number of parties, P 1 , . . . , P k , and let t denote the desired threshold for the shared Paillier key computation. For both parts, we ensure security against an adversary corrupting up to t − 1 parties, though naturally, given the threshold key any t parties may perform a decryption or reconstruct the secret key.
A few remarks are in place here. We first assume that the parties have access to PKI setup. That is, each party has a public verification key which all parties hold a copy of. Based on this, we may construct a broadcast channel. In addition, we allow any party to halt the protocol at any time by broadcasting an abort message. When this occurs, all parties broadcast all messages of the entire protocol (including all signatures) as well as all randomness used in all key generations, encryptions, etc. At this point it is easy to verify the behavior of all parties and assign blame. We may do this as there are only random inputs to the protocol picked by the participants, i.e. leaking them does not compromise any privacy. 4 We remark that care must be taken when running sub-protocols in parallel. For example, a rushing adversary could potentially break the entire protocol by using a ZK-proof of an honest party to fake a ZKproof of its own. The issues can be removed, e.g. by using broadcasts to ensure complete synchronization, and having all parties commit to all messages in a given round before actually sending them.
E.1 Generating an RSA Composite
In this section we describe our protocol for generating as RSA composite N = k i=1 p i k i=1 q i , for p i , q i being the shares picked by the ith party. We note that most of the steps of our multiparty protocol translate directly from our two-party construction.
KEY-SETUP.
• The parties run the k-party generalization of the shared ElGamal key generation: The parties agree on the group of sufficiently large order, Q, and a generator, g. Each party P i picks a uniformly random x i ∈ Z Q , broadcasts h i = g x i , and proves knowledge of a DL of h i to all others. The ElGamal key is now h = k i=1 h i . Decryption is analogous to the two-party case.
• Each party P i generates and broadcasts a Paillier key, N i Q 2 , and proves that it is well-formed to all other parties.
GENERATE CANDIDATES.
• We employ the same idea as used by Boneh and Franklin, [BF01] : Each party P i generates a random share p i for p = k i=1 p i . The parties broadcast ElGamal encryptions of their shares and prove to all others that they know the plaintexts and that these are of appropriately bounded size using ZK proofs π ENC and π BOUND . Similarly to above, the parties ensure that the share of P 1 is congruent to 3 mod 4, while all others are congruent to 0.
• Trial division is analogous to the two-party protocol. The parties broadcast encryptions of p i mod α for all primes α < B. Using the homomorphic property, the parties compute an encryption of the sum, and check if this is an encryption of a multiple of α, i.e. whether it is one of the values within [0, α, 2α, . . . , (k − 1)α]. Correct behavior is verified with π MOD .
• Repeat the previous steps to generate the second candidate, q, as well.
COMPUTE PRODUCT (N = pq).
• This step differs significantly; obtaining g N could easily be done [CDN01] , however,Ñ cannot be computed as in the two-party case, hence we would have to obtain the solution to the DL problem differently. The main idea here is to have every pair of parties, P i and P j , engage in a protocol to obtain an additive sharing over Z Q of p i q j = s
i,j instead. 5 Note that no other party receives shares of this value. Each party then locally adds all shares held, thereby obtaining a share from an additive sharing of
Additionally, ZK proofs on ElGamal encryptions are used to ensure that parties are committed to their shares and behave as specified. More formally,
-For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, P j broadcasts an ElGamal encryption of a uniformly random value, −s (j) i,j ∈ Z Q , and proves in ZK towards all others that it has known plaintext using π ENC . -For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, P i sends a Paillier encryption c p i ,j of p i to P j under its own key, N i . 6 Moreover, for each one, it proves plaintext knowledge using π ENC and that the value is bounded using π BOUND . -For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, P j computes a Paillier encryption under key N ī
where r i,j is a uniformly random n-bit value which statistically masks any overflow modulo Q in the computation.c i,j is then sent to P i along with a ZK proof that the computation was done using known values. This can e.g. be done using π VERLIN and an additional dummy encryption of 0. It is straightforward to construct a simpler protocol similar to π VERLIN ; naturally this would be more efficient. -For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, P i decryptsc i,j , reduces the resulting plaintext modulo Q, and denotes the result s (i) i,j . P i then broadcasts an ElGamal encryption of s
i,j and proves plaintext knowledge, π ENC . -For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, the parties verify that everyone is indeed committed to shares of the products, p i q j . Based on the encryption of q j , party P i computes and broadcasts a fresh encryption of p i q j ; correctness is verified by executing π MULT . All parties then compute an ElGamal encryption of
using the homomorphic property. This encryption is then decrypted, and all parties verify that the obtained plaintext equals zero. This demonstrates that s
e. that the sharing was indeed of the product. If any check fails, the parties abort the entire execution.
-For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, all parties compute an ElGamal encryption of
using the homomorphic property. P i the broadcasts s i , the parties decrypt the encryption of s i (resulting in the value g s i ), and finally verify that the broadcast value is correct, i.e. the DL of the decrypted value.
BIPRIMALITY TEST.
• P 1 has the share congruent to 3 mod 4, and therefore behaves as P 0 in the two-party protocol, while the rest behave as P 1 in the two-party case. Each party broadcasts its γ i ; P 1 proves consistency towards an encryption of (N −p 1 −q 1 +1)/4 using π EQ , while P i proves consistency towards −(p i + q i )/4 for 1 < i ≤ k.
Correctness: Except for the computation of N = pq, all steps are essentially the same as in the two-party protocol. Focusing solely on this step, we note that it is easily verified that the right result is obtained, by Equation (5), since all parties explicitly verify that the encrypted shares indeed sum to the products, p i q j .
Security: Again, as all steps are analogous to the two-party protocol except for the computation of N , the security of these is shown (essentially) in the same way as security for the two-party protocol. Regarding the computation of N , we must ensure that no party can deviate from the protocol in any way without being detected. The computation of the additive sharing of N based on the parties' Paillier keys can be viewed as a number of two-party computations (of additive secret sharings of products), which must be globally verifiable. This is achieved, since it is verified using Equation (6) that the sum of the encrypted shares of the product equals the encrypted product; the latter is guaranteed to be correct due to the use of π MULT . Thus, even if both P i and P j are corrupt, they will be committed to a sharing of the product. Further, a corrupt P i can obtain no information about q j as the addition of −s (j) i,j + Q · r i,j statistically masks any information. 7 A corrupt P j on the other hand learns nothing about p i , as it only sees semantically secure encryptions. Similarly, if both P i and P j are honest, then the attacker only sees the semantically secure encryptions transferred, which leaks no information. Formal simulation is possible by giving the adversary either fresh, random encryptions or encryptions of random values distributed as the statistical mask depending on whether it knows the secret key.
E.2 Computing the Threshold Key
In this section we present a protocol for generating a threshold key for (a slight variation of) the Damgård-Jurik generalization of Paillier encryption [DJ01] . Recall that decryption consists of raising to the power of d, where 
where φ(N ) and (φ(N ) −1 mod N ) are viewed as integers. The key primitive of the construction is to add secure multiplication and full decryption to the ElGamal scheme by maintaining a secret state based on additive secret sharing: The parties implicitly hold additive secret sharings of φ(N ): P 1 holds N + 1 − (p 1 + q 1 ), while P i holds −(p i + q i ) for 1 < i ≤ k. Further, the primary goal here is to compute an additive sharing of φ(N ) −1 mod N . This will then be multiplied with the shared φ(N ). To invert φ(N ), the parties utilize the inversion protocol of Bar-Ilan and Beaver, [BB89] , simulating Z N arithmetic in Z Q . Secure multiplication as well as decryption is achieved, by utilizing the ElGamal encryptions as commitments to the shares of the parties. The crucial observation is that when the parties hold additive sharings (over Z Q ) and are committed to those shares -through public ElGamal encryptions of each share -they may obtain an additive sharing of the product as well as ElGamal encryptions of these shares. The protocol, which we denote π Π , is essentially the same as the one used for computing N = pq above. Note that this construction is similar in structure to the protocols of Bendlin et al. [BDOZ11] .
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, party P i picks t i uniformly at random from Z N and r i uniformly at random from Z N ·k·2 n , where n is a security parameter. Each P i then broadcasts ElGamal two encryptions, c t i of t i and c r i of r i , and demonstrates plaintext knowledge and that they belong to the specified domains using π ENC and π BOUND . These will be viewed as sharings of random values, t = k i=1 t i and r = k i=1 r i .
• The parties execute π Π , obtaining shares u 1 , . . . , u n of t · φ(N ) as well as encryptions c u i of those shares.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, party P i broadcasts u i + N · r i ; the parties then decrypt c u i · (c r i ) N , and verify that P i broadcast the share correctly. If all checks succeed, the parties compute
Note that due to the restrictions on the t i and r i , v ≡ t · φ(N ) mod N .
• Each party locally computes the public value 8
this is then used to compute an additive sharing of w = t ·v; P i locally multiplies t i byv to compute w i , and all parties raise the encryptions of the t i tov to obtain encryptions of the w i .
• However, this may be simulated as it is statistically close to a large, random value:
• v mod N ∈ Z * N is the product of t and φ(N ). Since t is the sum of uniformly random values t i < N , t mod N is (except with negligible probability) uniformly random in Z * N , and -as Paillier encryption requires gcd(N, φ(N )) = 1 -therefore so is v mod N . Note that if t mod N ∈ Z * N , then we abort.
• Since v/N = u/N + r and r is random and n bits longer than u/N , then v/N is statistically indistinguishable from a random value distributed as r, even if all but one of the parties are corrupt.
Convert the additive sharing of d to a Shamir sharing: Given the additive sharing of d modulo Q, i.e. d i held by party P i and the public encryptions c d i of the d i , the parties may compute a "Shamir sharing" of d. Damgård and Jurik do this over the ring Z N φ(N ) , however, here this must be done over the integers, as N φ(N ) is unknown. The parties do this by converting the initial sharing of d to an additive sharing over the integers. In the following, let d = log n + 3 log N be the bit-length of d.
1. Conversion to an integer sharing is done by adding a statistically hiding mask to d; the shares then depend on the masked value and the shares of the mask.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, party P i picks r i uniformly at random from Z 2 d +n , where n is a security parameter. P i then broadcasts an ElGamal encryption c r i of r i , and proves in ZK that it knows the plaintext and that r i is of the specified size using π ENC and π BOUND .
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, party P i broadcasts m i = d i + r i . Moreover, the parties decrypt c d i · c r i and verifies the correctness of the share.
• Party P 1 sets its integer share of d to be
all parties compute an encryption c d 1,Z of d 1,Z .
• For 1 < i ≤ k, party P i computes its integer share 2. Next, the d i,Z are threshold shared. Each party P i threshold-shares d i,Z and demonstrates that it has done this correctly
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j < t, party P i picks a i,j uniformly at random in Z 2 2 log(N )+n where n is the statistical security parameter, and broadcasts an ElGamal encryption c a i,j of this. Moreover, it demonstrates knowledge of the plaintext a i,j and that a i,j < 2 2 log(N )+n using π ENC and π BOUND . These will be the coefficients used to share d i,Z ; let
Note that a i,j mod N φ(N ) is statistically close to uniformly random.
• For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, the parties compute encryptions c f i (j) of f i (X) evaluated at point j. Further, P i additively shares f i (j) over the integers among the players; denote P ι 's share s f i (j),ι . P i broadcasts ElGamal encryptions c s f i (j),ι of these and demonstrate that the plaintexts are known and of bounded bit-length, s : s = max d ; (log t n)(2 log(N ) + n)(log t) + n Moreover, the parties decrypt c f i (j) −1 · k ι=1 c s f i (j),ι and verify that the plaintext is 0, i.e. that P i actually shared the evaluation at f i (j).
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the parties compute additive shares of
in addition, they use the homomorphic property to compute encryptions, c f (j),ι of these values.
3. Finally, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the parties must reveal the jth threshold share to party P j . Damgård and Jurik reduce modulo N φ(N ) first, which we cannot do. Hence to ensure no additional information is revealed, a large, random multiple of N φ(N ) is added to each share.
• Since N is public and an integer-sharing of φ(N ) is given, it is simple for the parties to obtain an integer-sharing of N φ(N ): each party simply multiplies its share by N . Further, the parties compute ElGamal encryptions of these new shares, by raising the encryptions of the shares of φ(N ) to the power of N .
• For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, party P i broadcast encryptions of uniformly random, ( s +log k−2 log N +n)-bit values r i,j along with proofs that they are known and of bounded size.
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the parties execute π Π on the set of r i,j and the sharing of N φ(N ). Each party P i then adds its share of f (j) to this, and denote this σ i,j . Moreover, the parties compute ElGamal encryptions c σ i,j for all these shares using the homomorphic property.
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ k, party P i sends the share σ i,j to P j . Moreover, the parties decrypt the c σ i,j towards P j , who verifies that it has received the correct shares; finally each P j computes its share of d,
Correctness is straightforward: The polynomial f has been constructed over the integers. Clearly f (0) ≡ d mod N φ(N ). Security follows from the fact that all messages received are either encrypted or random shares, and thus simulatable. The final values, σ j are statistically indistinguishable from points on a random polynomial over Z N φ(N ) plus a sum of uniformly random, ( s + log n − 2 log N + n)-bit multiples of N φ(N ).
Paillier decryption To perform a Paillier decryption with the new threshold key, the parties must raise the ciphertext in question to the power of the share of the key. To prevent malicious behavior, each party must prove in ZK that this has been done correctly -i.e. prove in ZK that the exponent used is also stored in some commitment. Hence, to conclude the key generation, the parties compute and decrypt the ElGamal encryptions k i=1 σ i,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. They thereby obtain g σ j . Using π EQ they parties may show equality of two exponents, i.e. show that they have raised a ciphertext to their part of the key. This differs from [DJ01] who perform this secondary exponentiation modulo a power of N .
